Although the European Union (EU) has had responsibility for health since its inception, its roles and responsibilities are stilI poorly understood. In particular, its activities in relation to health services are often underestimated.' Until recently, those parts of the European Treaties that affected health services did so indirectly, such as those enabling free movement of goods, persons or services, all of which clearly include health even if this is not explicitly stated. Where health was mentioned, as in Article 129 of the 1991 Maastricht Treaty, the focus was on public health rather than on health services. This gave the impression that health services were excluded from the remit of European institutions, a view encouraged by some governments who used the principle of subsidiarity to argue that health services were best organised at national level.
In practice, despite their apparent exclusion, health services have been affected in many ways by European legislation, including harmonisation of private health insurance and pharmaceutical supply, and arrangements for movement of health professionals and patients. In addition, further implementation of competition law is likely to have an important influence on the shape of national health systems through its effects on public procurement and mergers.
However, any move to co-ordinate these policies is complicated. The decision-making process within Europe is complex. This has been exacerbated by the fragmented responsibility for health within the European Commission, with 13 of the 24 Directorate Generals having direct responsibility for some aspect of health policy. This was highlighted in a recent report by the European Parliament which criticised the European Commission for giving lead responsibility for the BSE (bovine spongiform encephalopathy) crisis to the Directorate General responsible for agriculture rather than to that responsible for public health.f This fragmentation led to a decision at the intergovernmental conference in Amsterdam, in June 1997, to revise Article 129 of the Maastricht Treaty. This raised considerable expectations that politicians would take the opportunity to create the legal and institutional basis for an integrated health policy." The final result has been presented as a significant improvement." but we argue that the new version contains several important weaknesses and ambiguities that may reduce the scope for effective action on public health and health services.
The new Treaty has one positive feature. The earlier, rather vague, provision that Community policies and activities should contribute to health protection is strengthened by requiring that it be incorporated in all legislation, from its inception. This should ensure public health input into policies on tobacco subsidies and agriculture which was previously missing.f although it remains unclear whether this will actually happen as there is stilI no-one specifically responsible for leading this process within the Commission.
In contrast, the new Treaty retains many of the limitations of the earlier one. It continues to state that setting priorities should be based on major diseases, failing to consider the broader determinants of health. This is attractive to some governments, as it marginalises issues such as welfare policy, inequalities in health and access to health services, and avoids ideological debates on the contribution of these factors to health. We believe that the ED missed the opportunity at Amsterdam to produce a clear definition of what public health is, which should have embraced an intersectoral approach based on the broader determinants of health.? thereby relating health to the ED's role in areas such as poverty alleviation, employment, transport, environment, housing, education and agriculture.
The Treaty has several new provisions that largely reflect the need to address the earlier ambiguity about health services. For the first time, there is an explicit statement of the need to respect Member States' responsibilities for health services, but this does not appear to have been thought through. First, it may limit the potential scope for co-ordinating European public health activities, given the interdependence of many curative and preventive interventions, such as some screening programmes. In particular, it may now be used to obstruct moves to develop Europe-wide health technology assessment activities that are opposed by powerful commercial interests such as the pharmaceutical industry which has pushed the ED to develop legislation to support a free market in pharmaceuticals. In this case the legislation was harmonised to establish the European Medicines Evaluation Agency in London and, as a result, Member States partially lost their power to authorise or restrict newly developed biotechnology and innovative medicinal products.
Second, it contrasts with the many EU policies which directly or indirectly affect the provision of health services. Consequently, the exclusion of health services from the Treaty means that health ministers will not have input into policies that affect their responsibilities. In the past, this led to failure to recognise the potential adverse consequences of European policies in other areas for social solidarity and quality of services. An example is the recent ED policy on private insurance," which simply requires companies to show that they are financially solvent. Insurers are not now obliged to obtain approval from an official body for their products and price controls have been removed, with the aim of stimulating price competition. Experience shows that J Health Serv Res Policy Volume 3 Number 2 April 1998 65
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The Amsterdam Treaty and the future of European health policy such policies lead to loss of quality and cost escalation.f Unfortunately, there was virtually no health service input to the development of this policy.
Third, the exclusion of health care systems contrasts with other statements on the explicit importance of a European dimension to health services, such as that set out in a recent Commission report that emphasised the need to 'improve efficiency, cost-effectiveness and quality of health systems so that they can meet the growing demands arising from the ageing of the population and other factors'. 9 This was based on European responsibilities for social protection. It proposed three actions: assessment of the potential impact of prevention on reduction of health care costs; clarification of whether and how introduction of market forces within health care systems can help save costs while fostering better quality of services; and ensuring access for all to health care. Based on this, the Commission is expected to bring together work carried out in the Member States on the efficiency and cost-effectiveness of health care systems, and assess 'which initiatives can be taken at Community level to assist Member States in reducing costs while maximising health gains'.
The Treaty also has some provisions whose inclusion may seem curious. As in the Maastricht Treaty, there is specific reference to the health effects of drugs, although normally drugs policy features more prominently on the agendas of ministers dealing with social affairs and crime. However, this is because co-operation between governments on internal affairs, including crime and the control of traffic in illicit drugs, is dealt with under what is described as the 'third pillar' of the EU, according to which discussions can take place outside the framework of EU law and beyond scrutiny by the European Parliament or the European Court of Justice. The public health article thus offers the Commission its only opportunity to have a say on this issue.
There is also a paragraph on 'standards of quality and safety of organs and substances of human origin, blood and blood derivatives' whose detail contrasts with the general terms in which the rest of the Treaty is written. This is designed to ensure that concerns about the safety of these products do not impede their free movement within the EU. However, later in the Article, this is counteracted by a statement that these measures shall not prevent any Member State from maintaining or introducing its own more stringent protective measures. Furthermore, those responsible for drafting European measures face the additional restriction that they should not affect national provisions for the donation or medical use of organs and blood, a constraint that appears to contradict the requirement to introduce agreed standards. These provisions closely reflect the personal priorities of the current Dutch health minister who held the presidency of the health group in the Council of Ministers during the run-up to the Inter-Governmental Conference. 10 She was particularly concerned to retain the ability of The Netherlands to exclude products collected from paid donors.
Given the rapidly changing nature of the challenges to health, it is surpnsmg that governments choose to embed these issues of current concern in a Treaty, rather than setting out general principles that would enable specific issues to be tackled through directives and regulations when necessary. Finally, the Treaty fails to address the institutional reform needed to make the development of integrated health policies easier. We believe that there is a strong argument for a new Directorate-General on health that could develop strategies and policies and co-ordinate the many, often conflicting, EU policies that relate to health.
Inevitably, the attention of negotiators at Amsterdam was focused on matters such as a common foreign and security policy and future enlargement, but health ministers could have ensured that all of their concerns were fed into the process during the long preparation for the conference. Unfortunately, it seems that they missed the opportunity, and a recent account by one of those involved in the preparatory work is a catalogue of conflicting goals and misunderstandings, with the final text presented for the first time at Amsterdam and agreed without discussion." There is little sign so far of a coherent European public health policy framework. Instead, it seems likely that the existing process of ad hoc movement will continue. A complex and opaque process of policy formation will inevitably favour organised interest groups at the expense of governments and citizens.
Elias 
Measuring hospital outcomes: don't make perfect the enemy of good!
In recent years there has been a proliferation of outcomes research in an attempt to measure the quality of health care. One of the types that has been most popular, and most controversial, is the development and sometimes public dissemination of risk-adjusted adverse outcome rates (usually mortality) for surgical procedures or medical conditions. To the best of my knowledge, the history in the USA of public dissemination of health outcomes data dates back only to the US Health Care Financing Administration Hospital Mortality Reports, which originated in 1987 and were discontinued in 1993. 1 The reported reason for their discontinuation was that, because they were based on administrative data (data used for planning and/ or reimbursement), they were inadequate for measuring inter-hospital quality of care differences. The first public report based on clinical data collected expressly for the purpose of assessing quality was the New York State Cardiac Surgery Report in 1990, 2 which was followed by a similar report on cardiac surgery in Pennsylvania that was released in 1992. 3 These reports, which continue to be produced, present risk-adjusted mortality for surgeons who perform coronary artery bypass grafting (CABC) and for hospitals in which CABC is performed. New Jersey is about to publish a similar report and New York has extended its reports to coronary angioplasty since 1996. Also, the Scottish Health Department has published clinical outcome measures on a hospital basis," an exercise being extended to England in 1998. Currently, several states in the USA, including Florida and California, use administrative data (also known as claims data) to issue annual reports on a variety of surgical procedures and medical conditions. The efforts mentioned above have been vociferously criticized in the USA and the UK. Among the reasons given are that the statistical models do not adjust adequately for differences in the pre-operative risks of patients, that the publication of death rates results in perverse incentives regarding treatment decisions that could have adverse consequences for patients, and that public dissemination results subsequently in over-
reporting of risk factors by hospitals that yields an inaccurate risk-adjustment process.
Inadequacy of risk adjustment
Some of the justification for maintaining that the models are not good enough is that there are large changes in provider risk-adjusted mortality ranks from year to year." Although this is true, the idea that ranks are an important indication of relative quality is merely an ignoran t misconception as to how the information is to be used. Hospitals are judged to have different adverse outcome rates only when their risk-adjusted mortalities are found to be statistically different. In fact most, if not all, of the reports I have seen present the outcomes in alphabetical order of provider, rather than in the order of risk-adjusted mortality, so as to discourage improper use of the data in the reports.
Creation of perverse incentives for providers
The only study I am aware of that addresses perverse incentives regarding treatment decisions is a study that concludes that significantly more high-risk New York State patients migrated out of the state to undergo CABC at the Cleveland Clinic during 1989-1993 than during 1980-1988. 6 However, the time period being used is inaccurate since New York data were released for the first time in December 1990. Also, the average severity of New York State patients at the Cleveland Clinic changed little between 1990 and 1993. Furthermore, the annual number of patients undergoing CABC in New York rose at a fairly steady pace, as did the average preoperative severity of these patients. A study using Medicare data (which is the only US national database) demonstrated that the proportion of New York patients referred out-of-state for CABC actually declined from 14.8% in 1989 to 11.8% in 1992 (Eric Peterson, personal communication) .
